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ABSTRACT 
  The Blocher-Gulati critique of the barriers to secession under public 
international law is insightful and thought provoking, an important 
contribution in its own right. I wish it had not been eclipsed by the 
authors’ clever and provocative fix: turning sovereignty into a tradable 
commodity. I suspect that this fix would bring about more suffering 
than the status quo for two reasons. First, a market for sovereign 
control is unlikely to be a market in any meaningful sense. Therefore, 
trading sovereignty would not discipline oppressors. Second, should 
something like a real market materialize, it could diminish the 
incentives for states to treat their populations better just as plausibly as 
it could improve them. Distant empires could find it easier to traffic in 
oppressed people and territories, which would pass from state to state 
as their masters lose interest. A class of marginal client statelets would 
grow, endowed with a poor stepchild of sovereignty, which would leave 
their people defenseless and voiceless. 
INTRODUCTION 
Are international lawyers too squeamish to let market forces save 
lives? This is the challenge at the heart of A Market for Sovereign 
Control.1 In their article, which is the centerpiece of a larger body of 
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 1. Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, A Market for Sovereign Control, 66 DUKE L.J. 797 (2017). 
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work, Professors Joseph Blocher and Mitu Gulati observe that people 
suffer and die as a consequence of public international law’s heavy 
presumption in favor of territorial integrity for existing states, even in 
the face of humanitarian crises.2 At best, this presumption might be 
overcome when a state’s government heinously abuses some of its 
people.3 If the abuse of an ethnic enclave is heinous enough, it might 
create an opening for remedial secession.4 However, the primacy of 
territorial integrity is so entrenched that even unspeakable human 
suffering—“genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity”—usually draws only the most cautious of challenges.5 
The authors argue that there would be less suffering if 
international law let the abused people pay to leave the abuser-state 
under conditions that fall short of the virtually unattainable standard 
for remedial secession.6 The abused could either strike out on their own 
as a new sovereign state, or sell themselves to the highest acceptable 
 
 2. Id. at 803. 
 3. The Supreme Court of Canada in Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] S.C.R. 217 
thus declared that “international law expects that the right to self-determination will be exercised 
by peoples within the framework of existing sovereign states and consistently with the 
maintenance of the territorial integrity of those states,” and that the right to unilateral secession 
“arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances.” 
Id. at 280–82. 
In the 2006 Ahtisaari Plan, adopted by the United Nations Security Council to address 
ethnic conflict in Kosovo, the province would have a measure of autonomy short of statehood, in 
recognition of Serbia’s continuing territorial integrity claims. U.N. Secretary-General, Letter 
dated Mar. 26, 2007 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc S/2007/168 (Mar. 26, 2007). As late as 2012, even as Kosovo gained more 
trappings of a sovereign state, Serbia ensured that Kosovo’s international legal status came with 
an asterisk. Serbia, LIDIJA BASTA FLEINER & VLADIMIR DJERIC, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012) (ebook); see also Responsibility 
To Protect: The Lessons of Libya, ECONOMIST (May 19, 2011), http://www.economist.com/
node/18709571 [https://perma.cc/4JSH-864C] (highlighting tensions between protecting human 
rights and territorial integrity). 
 4. See U.N. Secretary-General, Letter, supra note 3. 
 5. In the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, world leaders at the United Nations 
accepted in paragraph 139 that they “are prepared to take collective action . . . on a case-by-case 
basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful 
means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” G.A. Res. 60/1, 2005 
World Summit Outcome, ¶ 139 (Oct. 24, 2005). Security Council Resolution 1674 of April, 2006 
reaffirmed “the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome 
Document regarding the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.” S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4 (Apr. 28, 2006). 
 6. The authors use a too-sterile term, “welfare-enhancing border changes,” for their goal of 
territorial arrangements that kill, torture, and maim fewer people. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 
1, at 800. 
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bidder, joining another state that would adopt them as its own. The 
rule would shift from property (the abused belong to the abuser) to 
liability (the abused can walk away, but must pay the abuser).7 They 
say that the new rule would foster a market for sovereign control,8 
which would create incentives for governments to abuse less, so that 
fewer people would suffer under oppressive rule and die fighting to 
escape. 
The authors rightly highlight the human costs of the prevailing 
legal regime.9 Any presumption-based regime for secession would 
either condone more suffering or more political instability than most 
would prefer. In today’s world, the abused people are bound to stay in 
their home state despite extreme abuse; exit is truly a remedy of last 
resort. If the presumption were flipped, exit might turn into a remedy 
of first resort. Such a binary structure seems especially problematic in 
a world where the standards for ill-treatment are evolving and 
vigorously contested.10 It is not a comfortable space for line drawing. 
The Blocher-Gulati critique is insightful and thought provoking, 
an important contribution in its own right. I wish it had not been 
eclipsed by the authors’ clever and provocative fix: turning sovereignty 
into a tradable commodity. I suspect that this fix would bring about 
more suffering than the status quo for two reasons. First, a market for 
sovereign control is unlikely to be a market in any meaningful sense. 
Therefore, trading sovereignty would not discipline oppressors. 
Second, should something like a real market materialize, it could 
diminish the incentives for states to treat their populations better just 
 
 7. Id. at 803. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, 
and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972) (proposing a 
typology of entitlements). 
 8. In the authors’ words, “[t]hough there are fundamental differences, the idea of a market 
for sovereign control shares features with the market for corporate control.” Blocher & Gulati, 
supra note 1, at 800 n.7. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role 
of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) 
(arguing against corporate law doctrines that favor entrenched management and impede 
acquisitions where the buyer is willing to pay a premium for corporate control); Henry G. Manne, 
Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965) (arguing that antitrust 
law interfered with a competitive market in corporate control, blocking mergers that would 
improve management and benefit shareholders). 
 9. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 1, at 843. 
 10. See Press Release, General Assembly, Delegates Weigh Legal Merits of Responsibility 
To Protect Concept as General Assembly Concludes Debate, U.N. Press Release GA/10850 (July 
28, 2009) (citing the statements made by representatives at the Plenary Session of the Sixty-Third 
United Nations General Assembly discussing various interpretations of the responsibility to 
protect, which can come in tension with states’ territorial integrity).  
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as plausibly as it could improve them. Distant empires could find it 
easier to traffic in oppressed people and territories, which would pass 
from state to state as their masters lose interest. A class of marginal 
client statelets would grow, endowed with a poor stepchild of 
sovereignty, which would leave their people defenseless and voiceless. 
Here is the crux of my disagreement with the authors: they see the 
world as already full to capacity with poor stepchildren, and worry that 
the law would stand in the way of that one lucky waif—Cinderella 
Sovereign—who might otherwise be rescued by Prince Charming and 
find a happy home in his kingdom. If Prince Charming shows up on 
Cinderella Sovereign’s doorstep, glass slipper in hand, ready to pay 
ransom to her evil stepmother, why should the law keep them apart? It 
should not and, as other commentators have pointed out, it does not.11 
The authors add little to the existing toolkit: at most, Cinderella would 
gain the legal right to elope when the stepmother would not let go at 
any price. The cost of this potential benefit to Cinderella is borne by 
the international system, which risks producing many more orphans 
than princesses under the Blocher-Gulati legal regime. The authors 
appear to assume implicitly that better behavior is the oppressor-state’s 
only plausible response to the risk of losing territory in a market for 
sovereign control. They do not consider the possibility that the parent 
state would become more oppressive to push Cinderella out or to raise 
the price of her freedom. Furthermore, because the authors’ account 
ends with Cinderella and Prince Charming living happily ever after, 
they do not address the possibility of repeat trades, or trafficking in 
impaired sovereignty, once they make it easier for abusive parent states 
to raise revenue off secession. 
In sum, the authors identify a real doctrinal gap and launch an 
important conversation about solving an urgent humanitarian 
problem. However, their preferred solution hinges on a misplaced 
market analogy and is likely to fail on its own terms. Genuine 
sovereignty is most likely to emerge in non-market settings; a real 
market could bring about impaired sovereignty. In the remainder of 
this Response, I begin by defining the problem the authors seek to 
address, and the shared assumptions underlying their argument and my 
 
 11. See, e.g., John F. Coyle, Friendly and Hostile Deals in the Market for Sovereign Control: 
A Response to Professors Blocher and Gulati, 66 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 37, 45–48 (2017) (highlighting 
that consensual transfers of territory are permissible, and do take place, under the prevailing 
international legal regime). In other words, if the stepmother could be bought off, she would take 
the money and let the waif go with the prince. Conversely, Coyle points out that Blocher and 
Gulati do not help Cinderella enforce her right to walk away from an unwilling stepmother. 
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response, in Part I. From these assumptions, Parts II and III examine 
my two principal concerns with the proposal: that a market for 
sovereign control would not be a market, and that, if it were a market, 
it would bring about more suffering and less robust sovereignty for the 
very people the authors want to help. Part II describes perverse 
incentives for parents and acquirers in cases where a territory secedes 
from one state to join another. Part III considers an independence 
scenario, with no acquiring state, and further elaborates on the 
attributes of “Cinderella Sovereignty” that could become more 
prevalent in a market for sovereign control. 
I.  THE TASK AND THE ASSUMPTIONS 
It would be wrong to charge the authors with failing to solve the 
very problems that they do not attempt to solve, just as it would not do 
to assume a wildly different institutional setting from the one in which 
they situate their proposal. In an effort to avoid such pitfalls, I 
summarize my understanding of the task that Blocher and Gulati set 
for themselves, and some of the key assumptions embedded in their 
argument. 
A Market for Sovereign Control addresses the problem of an 
ethnically or culturally distinct group of people inhabiting a defined 
geographic territory.12 The authors do not take on the problems of bad 
governments or oppressed people in general. The seceding subset of a 
state’s population must be identifiable and reachable in order to 
ascertain its preferences and confer new citizenship.13 The territory to 
be transferred—along with its assets, such as natural resources—would 
need to be demarcated and valued, and its relationship to the 
oppressed people would need to be established.14 The parent entity 
from which the people would secede and to which they might owe 
compensation must be a state, not an oppressive tyrant acting in his 
personal capacity.15 It follows that the Blocher-Gulati proposal would 
fit neither Syria’s rebels fighting to overthrow Bashar Al Assad, nor 
the widely dispersed Roma people.16 It does not appear to address 
 
 12. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 1, at 800-01. 
 13. Id. at 817. 
 14. Id. at 818–20. 
 15. See id. at 818 (noting that the entitlement to compensation is with the parent state). 
 16. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 1, at 841–42. For an account of the war in Syria, see 
generally CHRISTOPHER PHILLIPS, THE BATTLE FOR SYRIA: INTERNATIONAL RIVALRY IN THE 
NEW MIDDLE EAST (2016). Despite its ethnic dimensions and the rebels’ intermittent control of 
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ancestral claims to land, where the people no longer occupy the 
territory that might be rightfully theirs—not even in well-documented 
cases of wholesale forcible population transfers, such as that endured 
by some Native American nations, or the Crimean Tatars.17 On the 
other hand, it might aid the Kurds in Iraq, or the Russians concentrated 
in parts of eastern Ukraine.18  
Like the authors, I generally bracket issues related to adjudication. 
For example, I assume that some international tribunal could 
determine the extent of oppression, the will of the oppressed people, 
the appropriate price of their sovereignty, and any other elements that 
might be necessary to apply the Blocher-Gulati secession doctrine.19 
While making this assumption, it is important to recognize that 
implementing the authors’ proposal would require an elaborate regime 
of fact-finding, adjudication, monitoring, and enforcement beyond the 
current practice of the International Court of Justice, and that any 
forum charged with implementation would have to work much faster 
 
some territory, the Syrian conflict is not over secession, but rather an attempt to overthrow an 
oppressive government. See, e.g., ELIZABETH FERRIS & KEMAL KIRI CI, THE CONSEQUENCES 
OF CHAOS: SYRIA’S HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AND THE FAILURE TO PROTECT 1–33 (2016). On 
the Roma, see generally BECKY TAYLOR, ANOTHER DARKNESS, ANOTHER DAWN: A HISTORY 
OF GYPSIES, ROMA AND TRAVELLERS (2014). 
 17. See NORMAN M. NAIMARK, FIRES OF HATRED: ETHNIC CLEANSING IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY EUROPE 101–07 (2001) (describing the resettlement of Crimean Tatars); GREGORY D. 
SMITHERS, THE CHEROKEE DIASPORA: AN INDIGENOUS HISTORY OF MIGRATION, 
RESETTLEMENT, AND IDENTITY 93–114 (2015) (describing the resettlement of Native 
Americans). 
 18. For the history of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq and violence against ethnic Kurdish 
enclaves in the late twentieth century, see DAVID ROMANO, KURDISH NATIONALIST 
MOVEMENT: OPPORTUNITY, MOBILIZATION, AND IDENTITY 92–112 (2006). For discussions of 
more recent developments, see, for example, Bill Park, Turkish-Kurdish Regional Government 
Relations after the U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq: Putting the Kurds on the Map?, STRATEGIC STUD. 
INST., U.S. ARMY WAR C. 20–22, 35 (Mar. 2014), https://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo47612/pub
1190.pdf [https://perma.cc/C93N-MU5P] and Loveday Morris, How the Kurdish Independence 
Referendum Backfired Spectacularly, WASH. POST (Oct. 20, 2017), http://wapo.st/2ippR7m?tid=
ss_mail&utm_term=.9987f8fabb94 [https://perma.cc/7PFR-ADM5]. On the Russians in eastern 
Ukraine, see, for example, Sabra Ayres, Residents in Eastern Ukraine Face Worst Fighting in Years 
in War with Russian-Backed Separatists, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2017, 2:45 PM), http://www.latimes
.com/world/la-fg-east-ukraine-fighting-2017-story.html [https://perma.cc/KP85-B8EB]. 
Paul Stephan has pointed out that this frame creates incentives to ethnic consolidation. 
Professor Paul B. Stephan, Blocher, Gulati, and Coase: Making or Buying Sovereignty?, 66 DUKE 
L.J. ONLINE 51, 62 (2017). 
 19. The norm-setting and fact-finding challenges echo the “odious debt” debate.  
A. Mechele Dickerson, Insolvency Principles and the Odious Debt Doctrine: The Missing Link in 
the Debate, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 77 (2007); see also Symposium, Odious Debts and 
State Corruption, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2007).  
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than the current international norm.20 A specialized tribunal with 
access to expert fact-finding therefore may be more appropriate than 
any existing forum; however, it is harder to start new institutions than 
to expand the remit of the old.21 That said, the authors’ proposal does 
not depend on forum particulars; for their purposes and mine, these 
particulars can wait. 
In sum, Blocher, Gulati, and I assume an ascertainable and 
accessible cultural minority population currently occupying a defined 
parcel of territory within a parent state, and an international institution 
capable of adjudicating governance quality, consent of the population 
(including procedural elements), and the price of sovereignty. I also 
assume, as do the authors, that the enforcement challenge for their 
liability rule is comparable to any other under public international 
law.22 
II.  THIN MARKETS AND OBSOLESCING BARGAINS: SOVEREIGN 
ACQUISITIONS 
The market for sovereign control is meant to create and negotiate 
a space between parent states’ rights to territorial integrity and 
peoples’ rights to remedial secession. As the law currently stands, a 
parent holds its territory as property and can transfer it without the 
inhabitants’ consent.23 Meanwhile, the people of the territory can 
 
 20. The average ICJ case takes four years to complete. Questions and Answers About the 
International Court of Justice, INT’L CT. OF JUST. 44 (2016), http://www.icj-cij.org/70/pdf/24b.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LJ7K-K52J]. 
 21. Compare, e.g., Barbara Bean, Law of the Sea, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. (Apr. 27, 2015), https://
www.asil.org/sites/default/files/ERG_LOS.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ECU-JFFX] (discussing the 
decades-long process of negotiating the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and establishing 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea), with Karen J. Alter, The Evolution of 
International Law and Courts, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONALISM 590–
610 (Orfeo Fioretos, Tulia G. Falleti & Adam Sheingate eds., 2016) (explaining the 9-year 
Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations conducted under the auspices of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that established the World Trade Organization). 
 22. Professor John Coyle highlights the challenge of enforcing non-consensual transfers of 
sovereignty against the parent state’s objections. Coyle, supra note 11, at 37–49. Because Blocher 
and Gulati generally avoid the enforcement issue, I take it as their assumption that enforcement 
of their liability rule would rely on the existing machinery of public international law. To the 
extent the authors believe that their scheme would be more enforceable than your average 
international commitment owing to the market incentives baked into it or any other factors, their 
article would benefit from a more explicit argument to that effect. 
 23. See, e.g., Paul R. Williams, What Makes a State? Territory, 106 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 
449, 449 (2012); cf. Steven R. Fisher, Towards “Never Again”: Searching for a Right to Remedial 
Secession Under Extant International Law, 22 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 261, 274–75 (2015) 
(describing a decision by a League of Nations Commission of Rapporteurs that principles of 
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secede (if at all) only in response to extreme abuse at the hands of the 
parent.24 Blocher and Gulati sensibly argue that this binary rule 
preempts potentially welfare-enhancing outcomes where the abuse 
falls short of extreme.25 To fix the problem, they would replace the 
binary rule with a three-bucket structure: in the first bucket, there is no 
oppression, but the parent or the minority wants to split up, and the 
two sides negotiate a mutually acceptable price;26 in the second, the 
parent is “oppressive or genocidal,” so naturally the minority wants to 
secede and may be able to do so under existing rules;27 in the third, the 
parent merely “denies representation or equal rights,” which would not 
be enough to justify secession today.28 The third bucket is where 
market forces would determine the price of sovereignty, by auction. In 
the alternative, the authoritative tribunal, presumably also using 
market-based metrics, would set the price.29 
In the remainder of Part II, I compare this proposal to its 
inspiration in corporate law literature, focusing on potential motives 
that might drive participants in the market for sovereign control. I 
conclude that any such market would be unlikely to produce robust 
price discovery. Using a hypothetical oppressed territory of Arcadia as 
an example, I then examine time-inconsistency problems that could 
arise for parent states and potential acquirers, and make the oppressed 
people suffer more. 
A. Corporate Control vs. Sovereign Control 
This market for sovereign control does not look at all like its 
inspiration, the market for corporate control. The classic articles in the 
corporate control canon, from Professor Henry Manne in the 1960s30 
to Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor David Fischel in the early 
1980s,31 address a highly-liquid, competitive marketplace—the U.S. 
 
territorial sovereignty allowed Finland to block a referendum-backed secession by the Aaland 
Islands). 
 24. See supra note 5.  
 25. Blocher & Gulati, supra note 1, at 803. 
 26. Id. at 819. 
 27. Id. at 819, 823. 
 28. Id. at 819–20, 823. 
 29. Id. at 821.  
 30. Manne, supra note 8, at 113, 119. 
 31. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 1162; see also William J. Carney, The Legacy of 
“The Market for Corporate Control” and the Origins of the Theory of the Firm, 50 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 215, 233–36 (1999) (explaining the academic development in the value of corporate 
control). 
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public equity market, where thousands of firms trade—with an 
argument premised on robust price discovery.32 An acquirer is willing 
to pay more for a controlling share in the target firm than the price at 
which its stock currently trades in the public market.33 The target firm’s 
management deploys all manner of contrivance to resist the welfare-
enhancing acquisition.34 Easterbrook and Fischel argue that the law 
should block management resistance in most cases.35 
What would price discovery look like in a market for sovereign 
control? In a world of fewer than two hundred states, only a handful of 
which could and would bid for new territory, active trading is 
improbable.36 Competitive bidding seems especially far-fetched where, 
under the Blocher-Gulati proposal, the acquirer must grant full 
citizenship to the people of the acquired territory.37 Such narrowly 
 
 32. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 1166–67 (arguing that stock prices 
reflect a collective wisdom of traders on the market). There is also a robust lending market to 
finance acquisitions of control. 
 33. “Control premiums” are a common feature of corporate acquisitions across jurisdictions. 
See Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A Cross-Country 
Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 325, 348–49 (2003) (presenting an analysis across eighteen countries on 
the value of the controlling block of votes in a firm). 
 34. See, e.g., Donald J. Wolfe et al., The Delaware Court of Chancery Reaffirms the Vitality 
of the Poison Pill in Airgas, 25 INSIGHTS 2, 2–3 (Mar. 2011) (describing how a firm attempted to 
resist acquisition by rejecting three different lucrative offers to sell shares).  
 35. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 8, at 1199–1204. 
 36. Territorial expansion is analogous to a major capital investment. Most countries are 
simply not in the market for new territory at any given time. In addition, potential acquirers are 
driven by a limited set of motives such as kinship and access to particular resources, which limit 
the number of suitable acquisition targets. 
Professor Mark Weidemaier highlights the thinness of any plausible market and points out 
that governments do not trade sovereignty even where they are currently unconstrained by law—
as the authors acknowledge. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, A (Very Thin) Market for Sovereign 
Control, 66 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 67, 71–72 (2017). For a discussion of the limited efficiency of thin 
markets, see, for example, Corporate Governance, Investor Protection, and Financial Stability in 
Emerging Markets, in FOSTERING STABILITY IN A LOW-GROWTH, LOW-RATE ERA, IMF 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT 2016, at 81–101, Emmanuel O. Nwosu, Anthony Orji & 
Ogomegbunam Anagwu, African Emerging Equity Markets Re‐examined: Testing the Weak Form 
Efficiency Theory, 25 AFR. DEV. REV. 485, 485–98 (2013), and Musarrat Shamshir & Khalid 
Mustafa, Efficiency in Stock Markets: A Review of Literature, INT’L J. ECON., COM. & MGMT., 
Dec. 2014, at 1, 1–22, http://ijecm.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/21232.pdf [https://
perma.cc/B7BG-JDFV]. 
 37. Weidemaier argues that governments can now trade elements of the sovereignty 
“bundle” relatively freely, which may account for their lack of interest in “bundled sovereignty.” 
Weidemaier, supra note 36, at 69–73. For example, granting full citizenship to the residents of the 
acquired territory would give them the right to move within the acquiring country. While public 
opinion about immigrants in destination countries is not necessarily a close proxy for what might 
ensue in a Blocher-Gulati acquisition of a distant land, it is instructive: a 2015 report by the 
International Organization for Migration found that 47% of respondents in top-ten destination 
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constrained acquisition terms, combined with the possibility of price-
setting by a public tribunal, are entirely sensible in light of the authors’ 
desire to advance human rights and democratic representation; 
however, they highlight the vast gap between their proposal and a 
conventional financial market that inspired it. 
Consider what might motivate a state to bid for territory in the 
market for sovereign control. First, there is kinship: the would-be 
acquirer’s population could share some combination of cultural, 
linguistic, and historical ties with the oppressed inhabitants of the 
target territory.38 This is where a blanket grant of citizenship would 
seem most plausible, because the acquiring state’s people would be 
eager to welcome their long-lost kin and ready to bear the costs of 
acquisition and integration.39 On the other hand, the universe of 
bidders motivated by kinship would be severely limited, perhaps to one 
or two neighboring states. To describe it as a market at all would be a 
stretch. 
At the other extreme, an acquiring state might seek new territory 
for commercial reasons: natural resources, access to trade routes, or 
simply land to accommodate its own growing population.40 Unlike the 
 
countries for migrants supported decreasing immigration, while only 15% were in favor of 
increasing it. See Neli Esipova et al., HOW THE WORLD VIEWS MIGRATION 14 (Int’l Org. for 
Migration 2015). 
 38. For example, the majority of Albanians favor a “greater Albania,” which would comprise 
all areas where ethnic Albanians live, including Albania, Kosovo, and parts of Macedonia. 
GALLUP BALKAN MONITOR, 2010 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 47 (2010). Similarly, a 2014 survey 
shows strong support among South Koreans for unification of the peninsula. Steven Denney, The 
Generation Gap on Korean Unification, DIPLOMAT (Jan. 29, 2015), http://thediplomat.com/2015/
01/the-generation-gap-on-korean-unification/ [https://perma.cc/HZN7-WKJQ]. East and West 
Germans, polled shortly after the reunification of their country, expressed overwhelming support 
for the outcome. TWO DECADES AFTER THE WALL’S FALL: END OF COMMUNISM BUT NOW 
WITH MORE RESERVATIONS, PEW RES. CTR. 45 (Nov. 2, 2009). 
 39. Even this is optimistic, however. A 2014 survey showed that only half of South Koreans 
would be willing to bear the cost of unification of the peninsula, despite overwhelming majorities 
supportive of unification generally. South Korea Says Economic Cost of Unification Would Be 
$500bn, GUARDIAN (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/19/south-
korea-cost-unification-500bn [https://perma.cc/ES23-B22W]. The costs of reunification can be 
substantial, and come without a guarantee of success. German reunification cost $1.6 trillion 
euros, and opinion polls have found that many Germans still do not feel they live in a united 
country. Erik Kirschbaum, The Dark Side of German Reunification, REUTERS (Sept. 29, 2010), 
http://blogs.reuters.com/global/2010/09/29/the-dark-side-of-german-reunification/ [https://perma
.cc/7FEW-XX4T].  
 40. See Antony Anghie, The Evolution of International Law: Colonial and Post-Colonial 
Realities, 27 THIRD WORLD Q. 739, 742–46 (2006). Weidemaier cites contemporary cases where 
states leased real estate, obtained project concessions, and generally acquired elements of the 
“sovereignty bundle” from other states to accommodate the needs of their growing domestic 
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kinship example, it is easy to imagine many rich states scrambling to 
bid for a well-located, well-endowed breakaway enclave, in the fashion 
of nineteenth century imperial contests.41 In a commercially-motivated 
trade, the acquiring state’s population would be less likely to support 
full citizenship for complete strangers in a distant place.42 The Blocher-
Gulati baseline of granting full citizenship rights to the oppressed 
would operate as a binding constraint on acquisition terms in this case: 
even if the trade made economic sense, its domestic political costs to 
the acquirer may be prohibitive.43 Given the option of leasing or buying 
particular assets in the target territory from the current parent state—
which would require no change in the law—the acquirer might forgo a 
full-blown sovereignty trade.44 
Other acquisition motives, such as altruism (saving the oppressed) 
and security (buying a strategic asset), are no more likely to produce 
competitive bidding for many of the same reasons.45 In particular, 
domestic support for paying the cost of acquisition and integration 
would be hard to muster in either case.46 
In sum, a market where states must extend full citizenship to the 
people of acquired territories would be vanishingly thin, and unlikely 
to produce robust price discovery with its associated incentive effects. 
 
economies. Weidemaier, supra note 36, at 72.  
 41. See Anghie, supra note 40, at 742–46; see also Roger Southall, Scrambling for Africa? 
Continuities and Discontinuities with Formal Imperialism, in A NEW SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA? 1 
(Roger Southall & Henning Melber eds., 2009). 
 42. See supra note 37.  
 43. See John F. Coyle, Friendly and Hostile Deals in the Market for Sovereign Control: A 
Response to Professors Blocher and Gulati, 66 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 37, 40–43 (2017). 
 44. Weidemaier, supra note 36, at 72–73 (arguing that states prefer to buy or lease discrete 
assets and privileges to full-blown sovereignty acquisition). As is the case under existing law, the 
oppressed people would remain oppressed, losing their most valuable endowments in the bargain. 
 45. A majority of the top-ten destination countries for migrants spend less on development 
assistance as a percentage of their gross national income than the average OECD country. 
Esipova et al., supra note 37; ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV, DEVELOPMENT AID IN 
2015 CONTINUES TO GROW DESPITE COSTS FOR IN-DONOR REFUGEES 6 (2016). Even the most 
altruistic nations spend only a small fraction of their gross national income on aid—which does 
not require their citizens to accept and integrate strangers. Id. Sweden, Norway, Luxembourg, 
and Denmark have the highest aid spending, while Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, and 
Spain spend the least. Id. U.S. opinion polls show a majority against increasing military spending 
or foreign aid. PEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC UNCERTAIN, DIVIDED OVER AMERICA’S PLACE 
IN THE WORLD 1, 21 (2016). European polls show an even greater aversion to increased military 
spending, while a soft majority of 53% support increasing foreign aid budgets. Bruce Stokes, Key 
Findings on How Europeans See Their Place in the World, PEW RES. CTR. (June 13, 2016), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/06/13/key-findings-europe/ [https://perma.cc/3XWG-
R7J4]. 
 46. Stokes, supra note 45. 
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On the other hand, if the citizenship constraint were relaxed, it would 
risk producing a category of second-class subjects—contrary to the 
authors’ stated objective.47 
B. Time Inconsistencies 
In addition to being thin, a market for sovereign acquisition would 
also be prone to a time-inconsistency problem: governments might 
make decisions in the near term that may not serve their longer-term 
interests. Promises made at the time of acquisition are unlikely to 
stand. Consider a kinship-driven acquisition. Suppose that two 
countries, acquirer and parent, are vying for the affections of the 
Arcadia territory. Both have historical, ethnic, or cultural ties with 
Arcadia.48 Some years after it receives and spends an up-front lump 
sum for Arcadia, the old parent might come to miss the lost child: after 
all, secession does not erase the historical, ethnic, or cultural affinity 
between the people of Arcadia and their ex-compatriots. Domestic 
political pressure for Arcadia’s return would grow in the old parent 
state. To mollify its constituents, the old parent might try to extract 
some more money from the new parent, foment unrest in the 
breakaway territory, threaten to invade, or all of the above. Russian-
linked violence in eastern Ukraine illustrates the possibility.49 In an 
optimistic scenario, such territorial competition might serve as an 
incentive for the new parent to treat the Arcadians well, consistent with 
the authors’ objective. It could also exacerbate instability and lead to a 
series of hold-up scenarios, with Arcadia perennially bouncing 
between two larger states.50 Commercial, military-strategic, and even 
altruistic acquisitions could follow the same pattern. In a legal regime 
that makes transfers easier, a parent state is free to change its mind 
after getting paid for the breakaway territory. Unless Blocher and 
 
 47. The most miserably oppressed might even prefer second-class citizenship in a reasonably 
benign state to living under a brutal tyrant; however, this scenario would be inconsistent with the 
authors’ essential objective of securing equal treatment for the seceding people, and would 
certainly not comport with existing human rights norms. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (VII), Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) (“All are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to equal protection of the law.”). 
 48. Compare the territory of Alsace-Lorraine, which passed between Germany and France 
several times in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. See infra note 50. 
 49. See Ayres, supra note 18. 
 50. To wit, Alsace-Lorraine was made part of Germany in 1871, was returned to France after 
World War I, was annexed by Germany on the eve of World War II, and was transferred back to 
France thereafter. Alsace-Lorraine, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/
place/Alsace-Lorraine [https://perma.cc/R8MF-B96P]. 
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Gulati further constrain the new market, Arcadia could become an 
attractive source of budget revenue for the parent, as it is sold and 
repurchased, leased and bought back, pledged and rehypothecated. 
The acquirer also faces time-inconsistency problems. Suppose a 
wealthy state buys Arcadia to gain a foothold in a vital region, or a 
buffer against adversaries. Some years later, the acquirer’s strategic 
imperatives have changed. Meanwhile, Arcadia has become a drain on 
the new parent’s treasury, and Arcadians are migrating to the 
metropolis in droves to escape poverty, taking advantage of their full 
citizenship rights. The acquirer’s population is grumbling. Arcadia 
turns out to be an “obsolescing bargain.”51 Should it go back on the 
auction block? Should it just be cut loose, left to fend for itself? And if 
it does not want to leave, should it be nudged out with a bit of 
maltreatment, paid to exit, or both?52 Obsolescence scenarios can also 
arise in altruistic and resource-driven acquisitions. They might be less 
likely in a kinship case, simply because it assumes a less contingent, 
more durable link between the acquirer and the target. 
In the market for corporate control, it is not particularly disturbing 
to see asset bundles or entire firms repeatedly passing from one owner 
to the next, so long as they are run more efficiently with each transfer.53 
In its sovereign counterpart, the political instability attending 
successive transfers would be a serious matter, likely to reverberate 
beyond the immediate transaction participants. 
 
*   *   * 
In sum, implementing the Blocher-Gulati proposal would not lead 
 
 51. The term became popular beginning in the early 1970s to describe capital-intensive 
foreign investment in developing countries, where large-scale up-front expenditure created 
incentives for later nationalization. RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE 
MULTINATIONAL SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES 46–53 (1971) (pioneering the term); see also 
Erik J. Woodhouse, The Obsolescing Bargain Redux? Foreign Investment in the Electric Power 
Sector in Developing Countries, 38 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 121, 127–28 (2006) (discussing the 
origins of the “obsolescing bargain” and investor responses). 
 52. See generally Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Forced Secessions 80 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 215 (2016) (reviewing the law governing expulsion of constituent parts by a parent state 
(“forced secession”), and arguing for a limited right of expulsion coupled with a compensation 
mechanism for the departing region). 
 53. See, e.g., Gregor Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 103, 105, 116– 19 (2001) (presenting evidence that corporate mergers are becoming more 
common, with successive mergers associated with more efficient deployment of corporate assets). 
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to a competitive acquisition market capable of disciplining abusive 
governments. It could facilitate some territorial transfers that would 
not happen under the current regime, albeit on non-market terms. 
Because parent and acquirer preferences are likely to change over 
time, the proposed framework could lead to further political instability 
and more oppression, as the territory becomes a pawn in power games 
among bigger players. In the worst-case scenario, instead of having big 
countries compete for their affections as Blocher and Gulati intend, the 
abused people and their territory might be shunted from one reluctant 
master to the next.54 
III.  CINDERELLA SOVEREIGNTY 
What if Arcadia chooses to buy independence, rather than join an 
existing state? It could finance this bid with its own funds (unlikely if it 
is oppressed), loans or grants from other (sponsoring) states, bank 
loans, private capital markets borrowing, or charitable donations. A 
well-located or well-endowed Arcadia might well attract multiple 
sponsors for its independence. Most bids would be driven by some mix 
of commercial and strategic motives; however, altruistic bidders might 
also participate.55 Larger, wealthy states might find sponsorship more 
attractive than acquisition, since a sponsor does not have to grant 
citizenship or make a permanent commitment to the oppressed 
population and could negotiate additional favorable sponsorship terms 
on the side. For private and charitable funders, financing independence 
would be the most direct way to get involved in the market for 
sovereign control. 
If a funder’s motives are purely altruistic, it might sponsor 
 
 54. What if the people of the territory do not want to leave? In one of the companion pieces, 
the authors observe that public international law and U.S. federal jurisprudence appear to permit 
expulsion, and they argue that the expelled people should receive compensation under some 
circumstances. See Blocher & Gulati, supra note 52, at 215–19. In this case, it would be cheaper 
for the parent to “persuade” the people to leave of their own accord by resorting to the very kind 
of repression and ill treatment that Blocher and Gulati seek to relieve in A Market for Sovereign 
Control. 
 55. The role of altruism in foreign aid has been vigorously debated. Compare Carlos Seiglie, 
Altruism, Foreign Aid and Humanitarian Military Intervention, 17 CONFLICT MGMT. & PEACE 
STUD. 207, 207–33 (1999) (modeling foreign aid and humanitarian intervention as driven in an 
important part by the altruism of the median voter in the donor states), and Andrea Civelli, 
Andrew W. Horowitz & Arilton Teixeira, A Signal of Altruistic Motivation for Foreign Aid, 16 
B.E. J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 1, 1–31 (2016) (finding that altruism accounted for a significant 
portion of major donors’ foreign aid), with Eric A. Posner, International Law: A Welfarist 
Approach, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 521–22 (2006) (describing cross-border altruism as “minimal”). 
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Arcadia’s exit without asking for anything in return—or might require 
the new government to observe human rights, environmental concerns, 
and development safeguards. Private investors and states that seek to 
advance their own economic or strategic interests might insist on 
commercial privileges, political allegiance, and other forms of 
payback.56 A long-term loan from a sponsoring government to buy 
Arcadia’s independence might be tied formally or informally to air 
base access, diplomatic cooperation, exclusive mining concessions, 
below-market oil sales, or a combinations of these and similar 
conditions. The seceding people’s quid pro quo with a private funder 
might entail similar commercial concessions, exemptions from labor 
and environmental laws, and other commercial benefits. To guard 
against time-inconsistent behavior on the part of Arcadia, the funders 
might structure the financing so that the new government remains 
bound to them after the secession—for example, disbursing money 
over time or taking control of valuable assets until the loan is repaid. 
In more abstract terms, the people of Arcadia would mortgage 
their voice in the new sovereign state in order to exit the old parent 
state.57 Sovereign Arcadia’s domestic politics would be constrained to 
meet the demands of those who funded its secession. Until it can stand 
on its own and cut the ties with its funders, Arcadia would enjoy a 
constrained form of sovereignty. Meanwhile, new funders might decide 
to make a play for Arcadia’s resources or loyalties. If the bidders keep 
coming, Arcadia might have more scope to negotiate favorable deals, 
securing more domestic political autonomy. Then again, if Arcadia 
were such a prize, the old parent would want a higher price for letting 
it exit in the first place. 
To be sure, Blocher and Gulati did not invent the problem of 
compromised sovereignty, which is commonplace under the prevailing 
international legal regime. Examples range from nominally 
independent Abkhazia and Ossetia, sandwiched between Russia and 
 
 56. The idea of tying foreign aid expressly to commercial privileges for donors is hardly new. 
See, e.g., Untied Aid, ORG. FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (OECD), http://www.
oecd.org/dac/untied-aid/ [https://perma.cc/BJ7A-P6VA]. A market for sovereignty would expand 
the scope for such arrangements. 
 57. See generally, ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO 
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 3–5, 44–54 (1970) (theorizing the respective 
roles of “voice” and “exit”—for example, political expression and secession—in response to 
economic or political adversity). Hirschman also elaborates on the challenges of combining voice 
and exit in the same polity. I depart from the original framing to consider what happens when the 
seceding population has no voice in the old parent state, and can only exit it in exchange for giving 
up its voice in the new state. 
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Georgia, to U.S. territories such as Puerto Rico and Guam, which enjoy 
a subset of sovereign attributes accruing to U.S. states and sovereign 
nations.58 
The story of Nauru illustrates the extent to which states can 
already mortgage their sovereignty under international law. The tiny 
island had no shortage of suitors: Germany, Australia, Japan, New 
Zealand, and the United Kingdom had all asserted military and 
commercial claims over Nauru since the 19th century.59 A German 
colony, then an Australian protectorate under the League of Nations 
and the United Nations trusteeship system, Nauru had rich phosphate 
deposits, which even after decades of exploitation by foreign powers, 
helped finance its independence in 1968.60 When the phosphate ran out, 
leaving the island an environmental wasteland, the government turned 
to a succession of short-term revenue measures that eventually turned 
it into “an archetypal ‘client state’” of Australia.61 Today, Nauru hosts 
detention camps for refugees rejected by Australia, where conditions 
are dismal and accusations of human rights violations abound.62 
 
 58. See, e.g., Gerard Toal & John O’Loughlin, How People in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and 
Transnistria Feel About Annexation by Russia, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2014), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2014/03/20/how-people-in-south-ossetia-abkhazia-
and-transnistria-feel-about-annexation-by-russia/?utm_term=.16185560e441 [https://perma.cc/Q
8ZA-FHKX] (reporting on Ossetia and Abkhazia); see also Blocher & Gulati, supra note 52, at 
222–26; Eric A. Posner, The Limits of Limits, NEW REPUBLIC (May 5, 2010), https://newrepublic
.com/article/74824/the-limits-limits-0 [https://perma.cc/9QP5-KHEP] (discussing, inter alia, the 
compromised sovereignty of U.S.-controlled territories in the wake of the Spanish-American 
war). See generally, BARTHOLOMEW H. SPARROW, THE INSULAR CASES AND THE EMERGENCE 
OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (2006) (analyzing U.S. jurisprudence that granted only abridged 
citizenship rights to the inhabitants of Puerto Rico, Guam, and other islands taken over by the 
United States after the Spanish-American war); Christina Duffy Burnett, United States: American 
Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 797 (2005) (interpreting the Insular 
Cases as permitting territorial deannexation). 
 59. Antony Anghie, The Heart of My Home: Colonialism, Environmental Damage, and the 
Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 445, 449–54 (1993). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Ben Doherty, A Short History of Nauru, Australia’s Dumping Ground for Refugees, 
GUARDIAN (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/10/a-short-history-of-
nauru-australias-dumping-ground-for-refugees [https://perma.cc/BZA9-DMGR]; see also 
Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Judgment, 1992 I.C.J. (June 26); Anghie, 
supra note 59, at 449–54; Anthony Anghie, Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru, 87 AM. J. OF INT’L 
L. 282, 282–88 (1993); Keri Phillips, How Nauru Threw It All Away, ABC (Mar. 11, 2014), http://
www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/rearvision/how-nauru-threw-it-all-away/5312714 [https:
//perma.cc/7LR8-BGRG]. 
 62. Doherty, supra note 61; see also Daniel Flitton, Push To Charge Operators of Private 
Companies for Alleged Abuses on Nauru and Manus, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Feb. 13, 
2017), http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/push-to-charge-operators-of-priva
te-companies-for-alleged-abuses-on-nauru-and-manus-20170213-gublsk.html [https://perma.cc/K
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All else equal, a competitive market for sovereign control should 
make it easier to create more Naurus, endowed with variants of its 
securitized rump sovereignty. A rule that allows oppressed ethnic 
groups inhabiting discrete territories to buy their right to secede may 
lead to robust sovereignty when the outside buyers and sponsors are 
driven by altruism or kinship—the Cinderella-meets-Prince Charming 
scenario. However, it would be hard to limit potential bidders to Prince 
Charming. Such a limit would do away with any pretense of a market 
or market discipline. This might be just as well, since in a real market, 
where funders are motivated by self-interest, they would have powerful 
incentives to create nominally independent captive states, and to 
prevent them from becoming self-sufficient—lest their loyalties 
weaken before the funders lose interest. The new states’ sovereignty 
would be a poor stepchild of the real thing. 
CONCLUSION 
Professors Blocher and Gulati identify an important problem: the 
existing binary regime does a poor job of managing the tradeoff 
between territorial integrity of the state and protecting minority groups 
within the state from oppression. The heavy presumption in favor of 
territorial integrity promotes external stability at the expense of the 
oppressed people, who have no practical recourse under international 
law until oppression becomes extreme. The authors’ proposal would 
open the possibility of secession for ethnic groups inhabiting defined 
territories, without the parent state’s consent and under circumstances 
that do not reach the extreme level of oppression used to justify exit 
under the status quo. 
A market for sovereign control is an elegant and provocative 
solution to the problem the authors have identified. If they could show 
that it would result in less human suffering and more human 
flourishing—or even if those liberated from oppression would 
outnumber those who suffer more abuse or abridged sovereignty in the 
market for sovereign control—the proposal should be adopted. I am 
skeptical that the proposal could deliver on its promise of a robust 
market and worry that it is wildly optimistic in the picture of 
sovereignty it paints for the oppressed. Table 1 below sums up my 
concerns: robust sovereignty is plausible in thin or non-market settings 
(kinship and altruism), but robust markets are likely to yield a poor 
 
4FY-BBZ3].  
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stepchild, Cinderella Sovereignty. 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
  
 In this Response, I suggest that the number of potential bidders 
for sovereign control in any given case would be tiny, effectively 
eliminating price as a mechanism to convey information and discipline 
market actors. Where one state acquires territory from another and 
extends citizenship to the territory’s inhabitants, the bidders would 
most likely be limited to states that share the same language, culture, 
or history. Others would have a hard time mobilizing domestic political 
support for absorbing strangers en masse. 
A territory that seeks to become a state in its own right may find 
more sponsors that are willing; however, it is unlikely to achieve robust 
independence in a market for sovereign control. The most likely result 
instead would be a second-class “Cinderella sovereignty,” where the 
new state remains heavily dependent on outside support, and funders 
continue to extract commercial and security concessions for 
Acquisition 
Motive 
Competitive 
Bidding 
Likely Exit 
Scenario 
Acquirer/ 
Sponsor 
Citizenship 
Time Inconsistency 
Voice/Political 
Expression in 
the New State 
Kinship Thin Join acquirer Yes Yes (parent) Yes 
Altruism Thin Independence No 
Yes (support for 
continued sponsorship 
weakens over time) 
Yes 
Resource Yes 
Cinderella 
sovereignty 
No 
Yes (acquirer/sponsor 
loses interest as its 
need or target’s 
resources diminish) 
No 
Strategic Yes 
Cinderella 
sovereignty 
No 
Yes (acquirer/sponsor 
loses interest as its 
strategic needs change) 
No 
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generations. Only when the sponsor is purely altruistic would the 
authors’ desired outcome prevail—a non-violent exit followed by full 
sovereignty. 
Yet when the motive is altruistic, support may be hard to maintain. 
Circumstances change, funders lose interest, old parent states want 
more money, or else try to get their old land back using force and 
disruption. Unless the new sovereign economy has become self-
sufficient by the time the sponsor quits, the young government may 
have to search for new patrons, shuttling from one to another, 
dissipating its chances of building a healthy domestic political system, 
and threatening external stability. 
In sum, a market for sovereign control would be a tall order, even 
assuming improbably robust enforcement and expert, authoritative 
adjudication. With or without a real market, the Blocher-Gulati rule 
would have important consequences for states and groups: more 
people and territories would change hands. The authors do not show 
that this state of affairs would lead to fewer orphans and less suffering 
than the old. They hope it would, partly because the oppressed peoples 
already suffer so much that it is hard to fathom things getting worse. 
But without more, there is no telling whether the benefits of letting 
altruistic sponsors and generous kin buy freedom for the downtrodden 
would exceed the costs of letting the cynical buy dependent, powerless 
clients.  
The authors could avoid such an awkward and likely intractable 
cost-benefit calculus by abandoning the pretense of a market and 
lowering the bar to secession under international law, subject to robust 
human rights safeguards—but that would be an altogether different 
project from A Market in Sovereign Control. Meanwhile, if there comes 
to be such a market, it would be reasonable to expect more trading at 
the margins, but no more glass slippers in a world teeming with poor 
orphans. 
 
 
